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BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
The text of a law governs its reach. We will neither read in 
new limits nor read out existing limits on its application. In 
seeking to lower his sentence, A.M. asks us to do both. 
First, he asks us to impose new limits on a Sentencing 
Guidelines enhancement. A.M.’s sentence for bank fraud was 
enhanced for using “device-making equipment.” U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). But he was also convicted of aggravated 
identity theft. And that conviction precludes any enhancement 
for “the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identifica-
tion.” Id. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2. So A.M. argues that his aggravated-
identity-theft conviction precludes the device-making en-
hancement. But while device-making equipment can copy 
means of identification, it is not itself a means of identification. 
So the device-making enhancement was proper. 
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Second, he asks for a departure below the mandatory-min-
imum sentence for aggravated identity theft. But the law em-
powers courts to depart below a statutory minimum only 
“[u]pon motion of the Government.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The 
government made no such motion here. So both of A.M.’s ar-
guments fail, and we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 2014, A.M. defrauded two banks and their customers. He 
put skimming devices and PIN-pad overlays onto ATMs to 
capture victims’ account information and PINs. He then used 
that information to make counterfeit debit cards that allowed 
him to buy goods and withdraw cash.  
But he got caught. He was charged with nineteen counts of 
bank fraud and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1028A and 1344. Under a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty 
to only one count of bank fraud and one of aggravated identity 
theft. Each crime required a separate sentence, because the law 
forbidding aggravated identity theft generally requires a man-
datory two-year, consecutive sentence. Id. § 1028A(a)(1) & 
(b). And the government agreed that, if it found that A.M. had 
provided substantial assistance, it could move for a downward 
departure below the guideline range (under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1), 
below the statutory minimum (under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)), or 
both.  
So the District Court had to impose two sentences for the 
two crimes, and A.M. objected to each one. First, he objected 
to his guideline calculation for the bank-fraud conviction. The 
Court calculated his guideline range for bank fraud as 15 to 21 
 4 
 
 
 
months. A.M. objected to that calculation because it included 
a two-level enhancement for using “device-making equip-
ment” to make counterfeit debit cards. U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). He argued that his conviction for aggra-
vated identity theft precluded that enhancement. The Court dis-
agreed. But because A.M. had cooperated, the government 
moved under § 5K1.1 to reduce his bank-fraud sentence. The 
Court granted that motion and sentenced him to only ten 
months’ imprisonment on that count. 
Second, A.M. objected that the government had not also 
moved for a departure below the mandatory-minimum sen-
tence for his aggravated-identity-theft sentence. According to 
A.M., the government had agreed to do so as part of his plea 
deal. He argued that, because the government had violated its 
agreement, the Court should grant the departure of its own ac-
cord. The Court refused, finding that identity theft is an espe-
cially severe crime. So it sentenced A.M. to the mandatory-
minimum sentence of two years’ consecutive imprisonment for 
the identity theft.  
A.M. now appeals. We review all questions of law de novo. 
United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 2001).  
II. AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT DOES NOT PRECLUDE AN 
ENHANCEMENT FOR USING DEVICE-MAKING EQUIPMENT 
 A.M. first argues that because he was sentenced for ag-
gravated identity theft, his bank-fraud sentence cannot be en-
hanced for using device-making equipment to make counterfeit 
debit cards. But that is not so. The Guidelines bar an enhance-
ment only for having or using “a means of identification.” And 
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while device-making equipment can copy a means of identifi-
cation, it is not the same as a means of identification. 
For those convicted of aggravated identity theft, the Guide-
lines say only to apply the statutory sentence. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6. 
That sentence is a mandatory, consecutive two years’ impris-
onment. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) & (b). But aggravated iden-
tity theft requires proof of an underlying felony. Id. 
§ 1028A(a)(1). That underlying felony may overlap with iden-
tity theft. Because, with rare exceptions, the aggravated-iden-
tity-theft sentence is consecutive, a defendant could be pun-
ished twice for the same crime. To avoid double punishment, 
the Guidelines bar enhancing the underlying felony sentence 
“for the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identifica-
tion.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2. 
Here, the District Court added a two-level enhancement for 
using “device-making equipment” under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). 
That enhancement applied to the underlying felony of bank 
fraud. And using device-making equipment is different from 
possessing, transferring, or using “a means of identification.” 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2. A “means of identification” is in-
formation “that may be used . . . to identify a specific individ-
ual,” such as a person’s name, driver’s license number, or pass-
port number. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). But “device-making 
equipment” is equipment used to make credit cards, debit 
cards, and similar “access device[s].” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(6) 
&(e)(1). That equipment can be used to copy a means of iden-
tification. The copying equipment, however, is not itself a 
means of identification. The Guidelines bar only enhancements 
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for using the latter. So the Guidelines do not preclude the de-
vice-making-equipment enhancement. 
Every other circuit to address this question agrees. United 
States v. Jones, 792 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600, 606-07 (11th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Sharapka, 526 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008); see United 
States v. Jenkins-Watts, 574 F.3d 950, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2009); 
cf. United States v. Taylor, 818 F.3d 671, 675 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(restating the holding of Cruz, 713 F.3d at 606-07).  
A.M. offers two rejoinders, but both fail. First, he points to 
the sentence right after § 2B1.6’s ban on enhancements for us-
ing “a means of identification”: “A sentence under this [aggra-
vated-identity-theft] guideline accounts for this [means-of-
identification] factor for the underlying offense of conviction, 
including any such [means-of-identification] enhancement that 
would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is ac-
countable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” § 2B1.6 cmt. 
n.2. He argues that the reference to relevant conduct includes 
all conduct relevant to aggravated identity theft. That includes 
using a device maker to steal people’s identities. So, he asserts, 
it bars an enhancement “based on [that] conduct.” Id. 
But he skips over a key word: “such.” Only “such enhance-
ments . . . based on [relevant] conduct” are barred. Id. (empha-
sis added). “Such” plainly refers to the kinds of enhancements 
just listed in the previous sentence: having, transferring, or us-
ing a means of identification. And that list is specific. It does 
not sweep broadly to include all conduct relating to a means of 
identification, and certainly does not include device-making 
equipment.  
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Another phrase confirms this. Section 2B1.6 states that the 
mandatory two-year sentence “accounts for this factor.” “This 
factor” can refer only to what immediately precedes it: a means 
of identification. See Cruz, 713 F.3d at 607. So § 2B1.6 bars 
enhancements only for means of identification, not for device-
making equipment. 
Second, A.M. argues that device-making equipment is used 
to make a means of identification. See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(6). 
But the act of producing something is different from using the 
thing produced. Making a drug is different from using a drug. 
So too, using equipment to copy a means of identification is 
different from using the means of identification itself. And that 
obviates A.M.’s concern with double punishment. His aggra-
vated-identity-theft sentence punishes his use of customers’ 
stolen PINs and account numbers; his bank-fraud-sentence en-
hancement punishes his using equipment to make fake debit 
cards with that stolen information. The enhancement captures 
different conduct. 
Thus, § 2B1.6 does not bar the enhancement for using de-
vice-making equipment under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). In so hold-
ing, we need not address other enhancements found in 
§ 2B1.1(b)(11), such as enhancements for trafficking access 
devices. Cf. Jones, 792 F.3d at 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (reaching 
that question); United States v. Lyons, 556 F.3d 703, 708 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (same). The District Court did not err. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED THE POWER TO DEPART 
BELOW THE STATUTORY MINIMUM ON A.M.’S AGGRAVATED-
IDENTITY-THEFT SENTENCE 
A.M. also argues that the District Court erred in refusing to 
depart below the two-year statutory minimum sentence for ag-
gravated identity theft. He claims that the government 
breached its plea agreement by not moving for such a depar-
ture. He complains that the sentencing judge failed to state her 
reasons for denying the departure. And he asserts that the judge 
applied a uniform sentencing policy, rather than evaluating his 
case on its own. But all these arguments fail because the gov-
ernment never moved for this departure, so the District Court 
lacked the power to grant it.  
Aggravated identity theft carries a mandatory-minimum 
sentence that binds district courts. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a). 
Courts may depart below a statutory minimum only “[u]pon 
motion of the Government.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
But the government made no such § 3553(e) motion here. 
Nor did the plea agreement obligate it to do so; the government 
agreed only that it could move for a departure below the statu-
tory minimum or the Guidelines. And the government exer-
cised this discretion: It moved for a departure on A.M.’s bank-
fraud sentence under § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines. But it specifi-
cally declined to move for a sentence below the mandatory 
minimum for aggravated identity theft. And it never mentioned 
§ 3553(e).  
A.M. replies that the government moved for a departure on 
his bank-fraud sentence. And, he insists, a motion to depart is 
 9 
 
 
 
a motion to depart—period. The motion is the key that unlocks 
all of his sentences. 
But the Supreme Court instructs otherwise. A motion to de-
part below the Guidelines “does not [also] authorize a depar-
ture below [the] statutory minimum.” Melendez v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 120, 124 (1996). Nor is an acknowledgement 
of a defendant’s “substantial assistance” enough. Id. at 126. In-
stead, to trigger § 3553(e), the government must file a “motion 
requesting or authorizing” a statutory departure. Id. at 125-26. 
That motion must reflect the government’s “desire for, or con-
sent to, a sentence below the statutory minimum.” Id. at 126. 
The government made no such motion. It expressly recom-
mended against departing below the statutory minimum. So the 
District Court lacked the power to grant the departure. 
* * * * * 
A.M. is in some ways sympathetic. While he defrauded 
people and banks, he then readily acknowleged his guilt and 
his fraudulent scheme. For that, he received a lower sentence 
for his bank-fraud conviction. But he is not entitled to the 
additional relief he seeks. The enhancement to his bank-fraud 
sentence for using device-making equipment was proper, not 
duplicative of using a means of identification. His plea 
agreement did not promise him a downward departure below 
the mandatory minimum for his aggravated-identity-theft 
sentence. And because the government did not move for one, 
the District Court lacked the power to depart below the 
statutory mandatory minimum. We will affirm.  
